He was his number-two man, his deputy at the time of the terrorist attack of 9/11. He was with him all the - the whole time. You know, al-Zawahiri was bin Laden’s leader. THE PRESIDENT: My fellow Americans, on Saturday, at my direction, the United States successfully concluded an airstrike in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed the emir of al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Get Involved Show submenu for “Get Involved””. The White House Show submenu for “The White House””. Office of the United States Trade Representative. Office of Science and Technology Policy. Executive Offices Show submenu for “Executive Offices””. Administration Show submenu for “Administration””. war that ended just days later, as the final American troops flew out of Kabul airport, leaving the Taliban in power. The car was believed to have been carrying explosives in its trunk. forces tracked the car for about eight hours and launched the strike in an “earnest belief” - based on a standard of “reasonable certainty” - that it posed an imminent threat to American troops at Kabul airport. The Central Command review found that U.S. Said’s review mirrors many of the findings outlined by McKenzie several weeks after the investigation. Special Operations Command, come back to him with recommendations for changes to address the gaps. is working to pay financial reparations to the family, and potentially get them out of Afghanistan, but nothing has been finalized.Ī second defense official said Austin has asked that Gen. While Said’s report does not find individual fault or recommend discipline, officials said commanders may decide to take administrative actions once they review his report. Said’s review concluded that officials made their initial assessments too quickly and did not do enough analysis. Said also recommended that the military improve its procedures to ensure that children and other innocent civilians are not present before launching a time-sensitive strike.įor days after the strike, Pentagon officials asserted that it had been conducted correctly, despite mounting reports that multiple civilians and children had died and growing doubts that the car contained explosives. The report says using a so-called “red-team” in such self-defense strikes that are being done quickly might help avoid errors. The review recommends that the military have personnel present with a strike team whose job it is to actively question such conclusions. The official said the review recommends that more be done to prevent what military officials call “confirmation bias” - the idea that troops making the strike decision were too quick to conclude that what they were seeing aligned with the intelligence and confirmed their conclusion to bomb what turned out to be the wrong car. The report, which has been endorsed by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, made several recommendations that have been passed on to commanders at U.S. 
forces genuinely believed that the car they were following was an imminent threat and that they needed to strike it before it got closer to the airport. was working to evacuate thousands of Americans, Afghans and other allies in the wake of the collapse of the country’s government.
troops and 169 Afghans at a Kabul airport gate.
The intelligence about the car and its potential threat came just days after an Islamic State suicide bomber killed 13 U.S. Ahmadi, 37, was a longtime employee of an American humanitarian organization. 29 drone strike on a white Toyota Corolla sedan, which killed Zemerai Ahmadi and nine family members, including seven children.
According to the official, Said found that better communication between those making the strike decision and other support personnel might have raised more doubts about the bombing, but in the end may not have prevented it.
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